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Abstract 
 
In several states workers who are unemployed because of a labor dispute can collect 
unemployment benefits. Due to imperfect experience rating, such policies can create a public 
subsidy to strikes. This study examines whether these policies affect strike activity. In particular, 
both cross-sectional and fixed effects models are employed to test whether an increase in the 
public subsidy inherent in unemployment insurance leads to an increase in strike frequency. 
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I. Introduction 
 
Since the turn of the century, all levels of government in the United States have 
experimented with providing welfare and unemployment benefits to strikers. Such experiments 
are always controversial, with the controversy in part focused on whether the benefits increase 
strike activity. For example, in Grinnell Corp. v. Hackett, a case involving the payment of 
unemployment compensation to strikers in Rhode Island, the First Circuit Court said: 
[The] present record suffers from a fundamental defect. It provides no support for a 
causal relationship between the receipt of benefits, which unions obviously desire and 
often actively seek, and longer, costlier strikes. . . . [The] record lacks even a crude form 
of what we assume would be the most relevant and probative type of evidence—
statistical comparisons of the length and cost of strikes in states granting unemployment 
benefits (Rhode Island and New York) and the length and cost of strikes of similar size in 
similar industries in other states not granting such benefits.1 
 
This paper presents empirical evidence on whether the provision of unemployment insurance to 
strikers affects strike activity. 
Some argue that because government transfers make it easier for strikers to support 
themselves, it is a truism that such transfers increase strike activity.2 There is, however, a logical 
problem. Although government transfers will almost certainly make it easier for strikers to 
support themselves, that in itself may not lead to increased strike activity. If government 
transfers strengthen the bargaining position of the union, then one might expect a rational 
employer to be more willing to settle without a strike, or, failing that, to settle sooner after a 
strike has begun rather than later. Arguing this way, one could claim that government transfers 
will reduce strike activity. Thus, it is not obvious how government transfers affect strike activity 
and empirical evidence must be used to resolve the issue. 
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Much of the available evidence is anecdotal and taken from case studies. For example, 
Thieblot and Cowin (1972) used a case study approach to investigate U.S. strikes in which 
workers received government transfer payments; Gennard (1977) did the same for Great Britain. 
More recently, Kennan (1980) used modem statistical methods to analyze the relationship 
between strike duration and unemployment insurance policies in New York and Rhode Island. 
Finally, our monograph (Hutchens, Lipsky, and Stern, 1989) analyzed links between strike 
activity and a broad range of government welfare and unemployment insurance policies. In that 
work, however, we did not test hypotheses on the effect of experience rating, under which a firm 
pays taxes that reflect the cost of the unemployment insurance benefits received by its 
employees. This study summarizes and extends that work by presenting new results on links 
between experience rating and strike activity. 
The second section of this paper describes current policies for paying unemployment 
benefits to strikers. There is considerable confusion surrounding this issue. It is widely believed 
that only two states—New York and Rhode Island—routinely permit strikers to collect 
unemployment benefits. Although these two states do allow strikers to collect benefits (in New 
York after an eight-week waiting period and in Rhode Island after a seven-week period), a 
majority of other states allow workers unemployed because of a labor dispute to collect 
unemployment benefits under specific (but not unusual) conditions. 
In the third section we use a joint cost theory of strikes to develop testable hypotheses 
linking unemployment insurance policies to strike activity. The fundamental proposition of joint 
cost theory is that strike activity is a decreasing function of the combined (union plus 
management) cost of strikes. To the extent that the provisions of state unemployment insurance 
laws reduce this combined cost, they will increase strike activity. 
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The fourth section tests hypotheses using state level data on strike activity. Since 
unemployment insurance laws vary across—but not within—states, their effects should be 
revealed through interstate differences in the level of strike activity. Using both cross-sectional 
and fixed-effects models, we find solid evidence of a link between the provisions of state 
unemployment insurance laws and strike activity. 
 
II. Current Practice 
 
The Social Security Act of 1935, which established the unemployment insurance system, 
grants the states considerable autonomy in establishing rules governing claimant eligibility for 
unemployment benefits. For example, each state can determine whether, and under what 
conditions, workers unemployed because of a labor dispute can collect unemployment insurance 
benefits. Federal tolerance of state autonomy on this issue, reinforced by several key Supreme 
Court decisions, results in considerable diversity in the unemployment insurance eligibility rules 
that affect strikers. We focus on three rules that are of particular empirical importance: the 
stoppage of work rule, the innocent bystander rule, and the New York-Rhode Island rule.3 
The Stoppage of Work Rule. In 1988, 24 states permitted strikers to collect 
unemployment benefits during a labor dispute if their employer continues to operate at or near 
normal levels. An eligible striker can collect benefits after the normal waiting period, which in 
most states is one week after the claimant files for benefits. Thus, in stoppage of work states 
strikers receive benefits virtually from the outset of the strike. 
In a sense this provision provides strikers with insurance against a failed strike. In work 
stoppage states, if a strike succeeds in forcing employers to close down or reduce the scale of 
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their operations significantly, the strikers cannot collect unemployment benefits (unless the state 
has other provisions permitting strikers to receive benefits). But if a strike fails in the sense that 
employers hire replacements (or strikebreakers) or are able to use supervisors or other 
nonstriking employees to continue to operate at or near normal levels, the strikers can collect 
benefits. 
This work stoppage provision has become more important with time. In the immediate 
post-World War II period the practice of operating during a strike was largely confined to 
advanced technology industries, such as oil refining, telephones, and broadcasting. In recent 
years, however, the practice spread to more labor-intensive industries such as newspapers, hotels, 
paper, and shipbuilding. There are several possible explanations for this development. 
Automation and other forms of new technology give many employers the technical capacity to 
operate during strikes. Moreover, as product markets become increasingly competitive, 
employers are .probably more likely to protect their sales, revenues, and profits by operating 
during a strike. Finally, erosion in union strength and solidarity as well as the high 
unemployment rates of the 1970s and early 1980s may have made it easier for struck employers 
to hire replacements. Whatever the reason, the work stoppage provision becomes more important 
as firms become more likely to operate during strikes. 
The Innocent Bystander Rule. In 1988, 44 states had an “innocent bystander” provision 
that permits workers who are unemployed because of a labor dispute but not affiliated with the 
strikers to obtain unemployment insurance benefits. More precisely, an innocent bystander must 
not (1) participate in the labor dispute (e.g., by picketing or refusing to cross a picket line), (2) 
finance the dispute (e.g., through the payment of union dues that are used to finance strike 
benefits), or (3) have a direct “interest” in the dispute in the sense of benefitting from its 
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settlement. Suppose, for example, that a unionized group of production workers strike their 
employer, causing the employer to lay off his nonunion office personnel: can the office workers 
collect unemployment benefits? If the state UI program has an innocent bystander provision, and 
the office workers satisfy the above three conditions, then they would collect benefits after the 
normal (usually one week) waiting period. If the state UI program does not distinguish innocent 
bystanders from actual strikers, both the production and office workers would be disqualified. 
The New York-Rhode Island Rule. Strikers in New York and Rhode Island can obtain UI 
benefits after a waiting period of eight weeks in New York and seven weeks in Rhode Island. 
New York not only disqualifies strikers but also innocent bystanders during the first eight weeks. 
Thus, New York uses a “no fault” approach, disqualifying all workers unemployed because of a 
labor dispute in its early stages, and qualifying them for benefits thereafter. This approach avoids 
the complicated problem of interpreting and administering the innocent bystander and work 
stoppage provisions. In contrast, Rhode Island’s UI program contains both an innocent bystander 
and a work stoppage provision. Rhode Island workers who qualify under these provisions wait 
only one week before obtaining benefits. In a sense then, Rhode Island’s law is both more 
“liberal” and more complicated to administer than New York’s. 
Do such provisions influence strike activity? In the course of collecting our data, we 
asked this question of all state unemployment insurance administrators. Although none had hard 
evidence, several speculated that prohibitions against striker receipt of unemployment insurance 
affect behavior. For example, the Commissioner of the Department of Economic Security in 
Minnesota wrote, “I believe that there can be little doubt that total disqualification from benefits 
during a strike, as provided by our law, is a significant consideration for employees faced with a 
decision whether or not to strike.”4 Similarly, the Department of Employment and Training 
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Commissioner in Vermont wrote, “I believe that the work stoppage portion of the labor dispute 
disqualification provision is the most significant in affecting behavior of the parties in collective 
bargaining or industrial relations.”5 Thus, there is an anecdotal basis for the proposition that the 
payment of unemployment insurance benefits to strikers increases strike activity. 
 
III. Theory 
 
As noted in Kennan’s (1986) literature review, although there are many economic 
theories of strike behavior, no single theory dominates. This paper adopts the “joint cost theory” 
developed by Reder and Neumann (1980) and Kennan (1980) to derive hypotheses about links 
between unemployment insurance and strike activity. This theory argues that strike activity is a 
function of the combined (employer plus employee) cost of a strike, with greater combined cost 
reducing strike activity. We adopt this perspective not because we believe joint cost theory is 
dominant—it is largely untested and confronts many worthy competitors—but rather because it 
yields sharp, testable hypotheses. 
Reder and Neumann argue that as the combined cost of strikes rise, bargainers develop 
protocols that make it easier to reach an agreement. Protocols are “the rules or conventions 
governing the procedure for negotiating collective-bargaining agreements.” These rules or 
conventions specify the procedures for negotiations, what topics will be covered, and how to 
know when a settlement is reached; they may include provisions for mediation or arbitration; and 
they may deal with rates and methods of compensation, work rules, and fringe benefits. For 
example, many municipal fire departments and firefighter unions abide by the protocol that their 
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salary settlements should exactly equal the salary settlements reached by the municipalities with 
their police unions. 
Although more elaborate protocols facilitate agreements, they are also costly to negotiate. 
As such, not all contingencies and procedures will be covered by protocols. “In specifying a 
protocol, bargainers balance the cost reduction from reduced strike activity against the increased 
cost of specifying a more detailed protocol…” (Reder and Neumann, 1980, p. 871). It follows 
that as the combined cost of strikes rise, bargainers will tend to negotiate more elaborate 
protocols and thereby reduce both the frequency and duration of strikes. 
This logic applies irrespective of the division of strike costs. If strike costs are large and 
equally divided between the parties, then both will seek to negotiate protocols that minimize 
strikes. If strike activity imposes large costs on one party but not on the other, then the party that 
bears the larger costs will tend to make concessions that yield elaborate protocols. Either way, as 
combined strike costs rise, strike activity should fall, ceteris paribus. 
This theory yields clear hypotheses on how government transfer payments affect strike 
activity. If the transfer payments are wholly financed out of taxes on the struck employer, they 
will not alter the combined cost of strikes. In this case, although the transfer payments reduce the 
cost of strikes to strikers, they increase the cost of strikes to the employer by an equal amount. 
Since the combined cost of strikes is not altered, strike activity remains unchanged. Strike 
activity is only affected if the parties to the strike do not bear the full cost of the transfer 
payment. 
In the case of unemployment insurance, employers pay “experience-rated” taxes; when a 
worker receives $1.00 in unemployment insurance benefits, the employer should pay $1.00 in 
taxes. But experience rating is not perfect. In all states there are firms that pay taxes that are not 
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commensurate with payments to their employees. For example, according to Topel (1984), in 
1973-1976 a California firm with an insured unemployment rate of 4 percent would pay a tax of 
62 cents on each additional dollar of UI benefits. If that firm’s insured unemployment rate went 
above 4.6 percent, its tax on additional UI benefits was zero. Moreover, prior to 1979 
unemployment insurance benefits were not subject to the federal income tax. Such “tax 
preferences” are a form of subsidy to the recipient from the rest of society. Although experience 
rating usually insures that the struck employer bears some of the cost of unemployment 
insurance benefits to strikers, imperfect experience rating and tax preferences insure that the 
employer will generally not pay the full cost. Under these conditions a joint cost model implies 
that when unemployment insurance benefits are paid to strikers, strike activity will increase. 
In particular, one would expect that, because of imperfect experience rating, states with 
“work stoppage” provisions in their unemployment insurance laws will have greater strike 
activity, ceteris paribus. In addition, in these states a greater “subsidy” to strikes should cause a 
higher level of strike activity. More precisely, let B represent the weekly UI benefit received by a 
striker, let t be the worker’s marginal tax rate, and assume that, due to imperfect experience 
rating, a firm usually pays taxes equal to m% of the UI benefits received by its employees. Then 
in the event of a strike, the subsidy per striker equals 𝐵𝐵[1 −𝑚𝑚 + 𝑡𝑡 (1 − 𝑡𝑡)⁄ ].6 According to joint 
cost theory, an increase in this subsidy results in greater strike activity, ceteris paribus. Of 
course, this hypothesis not only applies to work stoppage states, but also to New York and Rhode 
Island where strikers receive benefits after a period of disqualification. 
The “innocent bystander” rule raises an interesting problem in this regard. Since strikers 
cannot benefit from this provision, and since the firm pays for it through experience rated taxes, 
one could argue that the innocent bystander rule increases the combined cost of strikes and 
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thereby reduces strike activity. But this logic may be flawed; it is only valid if in the absence of 
the rule, firms do not compensate innocent bystanders.7 Suppose that, in the absence of the rule, 
the firm bears the full cost of compensating innocent bystanders for their income loss. (This 
could occur through pre-strike inventory build up, through post-strike catch up, or through strike 
prone firms paying a compensating wage differential to potentially innocent bystanders.) In this 
case, an innocent bystander rule could conceivably reduce the cost of strikes to the firm; given 
imperfect experience rating, under this rule the firm would bear only part of the cost of 
compensating innocent bystanders. There is then good reason to hypothesize that the innocent 
bystander rule reduces the combined cost of strikes. 
 
IV. Evidence 
 
In order to test these hypotheses, we collected data on strike activity, control variables, 
and UI program parameters in 50 states and the District of Columbia over the period 1960-1974. 
Data availability dictate this time period. Although strike activity occurs at the bargaining unit 
level, for testing purposes it is sensible to use states as the unit of analysis—unemployment 
insurance policies vary across, but not within, states. If transfer policies affect strike activity, 
then, holding other factors constant, one should observe predictable patterns of strike activity 
across states and over time.8 
The analysis uses several measures of state unemployment insurance policy. Three binary 
(0-1) variables indicate whether or not a state has a work-stoppage rule, an innocent bystander 
rule, or a New York-Rhode Island rule. As shown in Tables 1 and 2, the set of states using the 
work stoppage and innocent bystander rule changed with time, while those using the New York-
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Rhode Island rule did not. The lack of intertemporal variation in the New York-Rhode Island 
rule means that the effects of this rule can only be analyzed in a cross-section. 
We use the maximum UI benefit in a state as a proxy for the unemployment insurance 
subsidy per striker. Ideally, the subsidy would be measured as Bk, where B is the weekly UI 
benefit received by a striker, and 𝑘𝑘 = [1 −𝑚𝑚 + 𝑡𝑡 (1 − 𝑡𝑡)⁄ ]. The maximum UI benefit is a good 
measure of B for three reasons. First, the maximum is strictly a function of state unemployment 
insurance policy.9 Second, given their comparatively high earnings, union members are likely to 
receive unemployment benefits that are at or near the maximum. Third, data on the maximum are 
available for all states over the 1960-1974 time period. 
 
 
Insert Table 1 Here 
 
 
 
Insert Table 2 Here 
 
 
To compute the subsidy, one would ideally obtain information on k, multiply k by the 
maximum UI benefit, and thereby obtain a proxy for Bk. That is not, however, possible; there do 
not exist data on experience rating for all states over the period of analysis. There are, however, a 
handful of states (referred to as the “reserve-ratio” states) for which experience rating can be 
measured over most of the time period. For these states one can compute k and, using the 
maximum UI benefit, obtain a second measure of the UI subsidy per striker. These states can 
then be used to examine whether the maximum UI benefit is a good proxy for the subsidy per 
striker. 
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Our measure of k in these reserve ratio states is derived from Topel (1983, 1984). Since 
𝑘𝑘 = [1 −𝑚𝑚 + 𝑡𝑡 (1 − 𝑡𝑡)⁄ ], k can be computed from data on t and m. Topel used information on 
state and federal income taxes to compute t and developed methods for using information on 
experience rating to compute the marginal cost of a dollar of UI benefits for a specific firm in a 
specific state. Denote this marginal cost as e(u,s), where u is the firm’s insured unemployment 
rate (the steady state fraction of the firm’s employees that are unemployed and receiving UI), and 
s indicates jurisdiction VI We computed e(u,s) for firms within 27 reserve-ratio states for the 
period 1960-1971. Data were not available for other states or years. Our state specific measure of 
m, denoted as m(s), is the average of e(u,s) over a fixed distribution of firms with different 
insured unemployment rates. Thus, letting f(u) denote the distribution of firm-specific insured 
unemployment rates, 
𝑚𝑚(𝑠𝑠) = �𝑒𝑒(𝑢𝑢, 𝑠𝑠)𝑓𝑓(𝑢𝑢)𝑑𝑑𝑢𝑢. 
Note that since f(u) is the same for all states, m(s) has the desirable quality of being 
strictly a function of state experience rating policies; it does not depend on the industrial 
composition of a state. An appendix is available from the authors with further details on the 
computation of k. 
We use data on strike frequency as a measure of strike activity. More precisely, our 
dependent variable is the natural logarithm of (# strikes in state i in year j)/ 
(# labor force participants in state i and year j). The numerator is computed from the U S. 
Department of Labor Work Stoppage Historical File, and the denominator is computed from 
Census data.10 Although one can conceive of other state-level measures of strike activity (e.g., 
the average size or duration of strikes in a state), these measures are either theoretically 
Unemployment Insurance and Strikes        14 
 
inappropriate or potentially flawed by sample selection bias.11 Strike frequency yields a clean 
test of the hypotheses. 
Finally, since it is only after holding other factors constant that we expect a relationship 
between transfers and strike activity, the analysis requires a vector of control variables. That 
raises difficult conceptual problems. Whereas theories of strike activity focus on the bargaining 
unit, this research uses state level data. Variables that are appropriate controls for an analysis of 
strike activity at the level of the bargaining unit (e.g., a measure of the capacity to buffer input 
shocks through inventory fluctuations) may not be appropriate or, if appropriate, may not be 
available for an analysis of strike activity at the state level. How does one specify a parsimonious 
vector of control variables in a state-level analysis of strike activity? 
We resolved this quandary by collecting data on a long list of variables and examining 
whether results on UI program parameters were robust to variation in the vector of controls. Our 
list of 27 control variables included economic variables (e.g., industry composition), political 
variables (e.g., whether or not the state is a right-to- work state), and demographic variables (e.g., 
percent female in the state).12 The empirical literature on strikes links several of these variables 
to strike activity. 
Because specification analyses raise questions about a model’s statistical properties, we 
restricted our examination of alternative control variables to the 1970 cross-section. This 
permitted us to take advantage of the 1970 Census which provides a wealth of state-level data. 
Our strategy was first to use the 1970 data to arrive at a parsimonious vector of control variables. 
We then took the resulting specification as given and examined whether results could be 
replicated in other cross-sections and over time. 
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Table 3 displays key results for 1970. The model in the first column includes dummy 
variables indicating that the state has a work stoppage (WS) rule, a New York-Rhode Island 
(NYRI) rule, or an innocent bystander (IB) rule. Our theory predicts positive coefficients on each 
of these rules. As indicated in column 1, although the coefficient on WS and NYRI are positive, 
neither is statistically significant at conventional levels. 
The models in columns 2-4 of Table 3 test whether the effect of these UI rules depend on 
the maximum benefit. Given imperfect experience rating and the tax treatment of unemployment 
benefits, a higher maximum in states with any of the three rules should lead to lower strike costs, 
less comprehensive protocols, and increased strike activity. The column 2 model interacts the 
WS rule with the maximum UI benefit. Since the coefficient on this interaction is positive and 
statistically significant, the results indicate that a higher maximum benefit in states with the WS 
rule is associated with a higher strike frequency. 
Although similar results obtain when the IB rule is interacted with the maximum benefit, 
if both the WS rule interaction and the IB rule interaction are included in the regression, then 
neither is statistically significant (column 3).13 This is because the two interaction terms are 
highly correlated. Accordingly, this evidence indicates that either the WS rule interaction or the 
IB rule interaction is associated with higher strike frequencies. But there is no basis for a claim 
that one of the interactions is the principle source of the association. Thus, column 4 presents a 
fourth regression with an interaction between the maximum UI benefit and a variable indicating 
states that use either the WS rule or the IB rule. The coefficient on this interaction term is 
positive and statistically significant, a plausible result indicating that for states with either the 
WS rule or the IB rule, an increase in program generosity, as proxied by the maximum benefit, is 
associated with more strikes. 
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Insert Table 3 Here 
 
 
Such results in part depend on the other independent variables in the model. The Table 3 
models include six control variables that are proxies for the complex web of social and economic 
forces that shape strike activity within a geographic unit. In addition to these, we tested a long 
list of alternative independent variables. Results on the interaction variable were remarkably 
insensitive to such changes in specification (for example, see Appendix Table A.1). 
The temptation to seek “explanations” for the coefficients on the control variables in 
Table 3 should be resisted. Consider, for example, the statistically insignificant coefficient on “% 
establishments with 100+ employees.” This coefficient should not be interpreted as revealing 
that establishment size has little to do with strike activity. That hypothesis is best tested with 
plant level data. When the state is the unit of observation, this variable acts as a proxy for a 
network of forces that influence strike activity in the state. 
Table 4 provides estimates which show that the 1970 results can be replicated in other 
years. The relationship between the interaction variable and strike frequency is thoroughly robust 
across different years.14 These estimates indicate that the 1970 result is not simply a statistical 
artifact. 
 
 
Insert Table 4 Here 
 
 
Such results could, however, be challenged as a consequence of unobserved variables. 
Suppose there exist unobserved state-specific determinants of strike frequency that are positively 
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correlated with the interaction variable. Then the cross-section results do not address the issue of 
whether the unemployment insurance system actually leads to more strikes; the results may 
simply reveal that the interaction variable is correlated with some unobserved state-specific 
determinant of strike frequency that persists over time. 
In order to examine this issue, we ran a fixed-effects version of the model. In essence we 
pooled together 15 years of data on the 51 jurisdictions and estimated the Table 3, column 4 
model with a separate intercept for each jurisdiction. Since separate intercepts control for time-
invariant (fixed) unobserved state characteristics, the fixed-effects model allows us to test 
whether the interaction result is due to state-specific fixed effects that are unrelated to the 
unemployment insurance system. 
Two data issues are notable. First, because the NYRI variable equals “1” throughout the 
15-year sample period, it is perfectly correlated with the state-specific intercepts and must be 
excluded to avoid collinearity. Second, although we had data on strike frequency for all states 
and all years, that was not the case for the independent variables. For example, data on WS and 
IB are not available for 1961, 1963, 1965, and 1969. In such cases we interpolated the missing 
data. 
Table 5 presents the fixed-effects results which are quite similar to the cross-section 
results. The coefficient on the interaction variable is positive and statistically significant, 
implying that the cross-section results are not simply a product of unobserved, state-specific, 
fixed effects. Moreover, the magnitude of this coefficient is similar to that in the cross-section. 
All regressions indicate that in states that use an innocent bystander or stoppage of work” 
disqualification rule, a one percent increase in the maximum benefit is associated with a .5 
percent increase in strike frequency, ceteris paribus. Since we only tested one model with this 
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pooled data set, the Table 5 results are statistically meaningful in the sense that they are not a 
consequence of testing numerous models with the same data. Thus, this table offers strong 
evidence of a link between the payment of UI benefits to strikers and strike frequency.15 
Joint cost theory yields a clear interpretation of the above result: a greater subsidy per striker 
results in greater strike activity. Yet this interpretation is only tenable if the maximum UI benefit 
is a good proxy for the subsidy per striker. Since this subsidy not only depends upon the 
maximum but also experience rating, there are grounds for doubt. For the joint cost interpretation 
to be fully convincing, better information on the subsidy per striker must be obtained. 
We obtained such information by using data on experience rating and federal and state income 
taxes to compute the subsidy per striker, Bk, where B is the maximum UI benefit and 𝑘𝑘 = [1 −
𝑚𝑚 + 𝑡𝑡 (1 − 𝑡𝑡)⁄ ]. Due to data limitations, the subsidy could only be computed for 27 reserve-ratio 
states over the period 1960-1971. (An Appendix available on request presents details on 
computation of k.) In this sample the correlation between B and Bk was .93, suggesting that the 
maximum is a good proxy for the subsidy. 
 
 
Insert Table 5 Here 
 
 
Table 6 presents fixed-effect results. The model in column 1 uses the previous interaction 
variable (the product of the maximum UI benefit and a variable indicating whether a state uses 
either the WS or the IB rule). Although the coefficient on this variable remains positive, in the 
smaller sample it ceases to be statistically significant at conventional levels.16 In column 2 we 
replace the maximum benefit with our measure of the subsidy per striker. The key finding is that 
the coefficient on the new interaction variable is positive and attains a higher level of statistical 
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significance than the coefficient on the column 1 interaction variable. As such, a joint cost 
interpretation of the earlier results is tenable. The Table 6 estimates indicate that replacement of 
the maximum with the subsidy per striker strengthens the statistical relationship between the 
unemployment insurance system and strike activity. The evidence is consistent with the 
hypothesis that a greater UI subsidy per striker results in more strikes. 
 
V. Conclusion 
 
This study establishes a link between the unemployment insurance system and strike 
frequency. A higher maximum UI benefit is related to a higher strike frequency in states that use 
“innocent bystander” or “stoppage of work” disqualification rules. The relationship not only 
arises in cross-sectional models for 1960, 1966, 1970, and 1974, but also in a fixed-effects model 
for the period 1960-1974. Moreover, this relationship is not trivial: In states with these 
disqualification rules, a one percent increase in the maximum benefit is associated with a .5 
percent increase in strike frequency, ceteris paribus. There is good reason to believe that this is a 
causal relationship; not only are the results consistent with a joint cost theory of strikes, but also, 
when it is possible to regress strike frequency on a measure of the subsidy per striker, an even 
stronger relationship obtains. Providing unemployment insurance to strikers does indeed increase 
strike activity. 
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Notes 
 
1Grinnell Corp v. Hackett, 475 F. 2d 449 at 459 (1st Cir., 1973). 
2In the Circuit Court’s decision in the New York Telephone case, Judge Owen wrote, “I regard it 
as a fundamental truism that the availability to, or expectation of a substantial weekly, tax-free 
payment of money by a striker is a substantial factor affecting his willingness to strike or, once 
on strike, to remain on strike, in the pursuit of desired goals. This being a truism, one therefore 
would expect to find confirmation of it everywhere. One does.” New York Telephone Co. v. New 
York State Department of Labor, 556 F. 2d 388 (2d Cir. 1977), 96 LRRM 2921 at 2926. 
3Hutchens, Lipsky, and Stem (1989, Chapters 2 and 3) discuss other less important rules. 
4Letter written by Rolf Middleton, Commissioner, Minnesota Department of Economic Security, 
390 North Robert Street, St. Paul Minnesota, January 6, 1982. 
5Letter from Sandra D. Dragon, Commissioner, Department of Employment and Training, State 
of Vermont, P.O. Box 488, Montpelier, Vermont, dated December 28, 1981. 
6When the benefits are not taxed, strikers receive a benefit (B) that is equivalent to X in taxable 
income, where 𝑋𝑋(1 − 𝑡𝑡) = 𝐵𝐵. That implies a subsidy of 𝑋𝑋 − 𝐵𝐵 = 𝐵𝐵(1 (1 − 𝑡𝑡)⁄ = 𝐵𝐵[𝑡𝑡 (1 − 𝑡𝑡)⁄ ]. 
Since employers only pay mB, the total subsidy is 𝐵𝐵[1 −𝑚𝑚 + 𝑡𝑡 (1 − 𝑡𝑡)⁄ ]. 
7The literature contains no evidence on whether innocent bystanders are in fact compensated. 
This is a topic for future research. 
8We did look for data on strikes by bargaining units. None of the available data sets had 
necessary information on key control variables or on the distribution of bargaining unit 
membership across states. A goal for future research would be to collect and analyze such data. 
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9In contrast the average benefit in the state depends not only on state policy but also on 
environmental variables like the average wage in the state or the state’s ratio of part time to full-
time workers. Since the maximum is an instrument of and depends only on state policy, 
empirical results on the maximum yield information on the effects of state policy. 
10Consistent with a theory of joint costs, the numerator includes all strikes. Alternative measures 
(e.g., “number of strikes during the negotiation of new contracts” or “number of strikes over 
economic issues”) are highly correlated with this measure, and yield results similar to those 
presented here. The denominator is interpolated from data on the resident civilian population in 
the state in a given year (U.S. Bureau of the Census, Series P-25 No. 460, Table 2 and No. 876, 
Table 4), and from 1960 and 1970 Census data on labor force participation in the state. Although 
the ideal denominator would be the number of bargaining units in the state, such data do not 
exist. We also estimated models with number of union members and number of establishments in 
the denominator. Results were thoroughly insensitive to such changes. 
11A joint cost theory yields no hypotheses on the determinants of the average size of strikes (the 
number of workers involved per strike) in a state. Moreover, to analyze the average size of 
strikes one should control for the average size of bargaining units in a state, and such data are not 
available. Although a joint cost theory does yield hypotheses on strike duration, our state level 
data on the average duration of strikes are inappropriate for testing these hypotheses. Our 
duration data come from a self-selected sample of bargaining units that actually experienced a 
strike, and there is no way to control for selection bias. See Hutchens, Lipsky, and Stem (1989) 
for the full argument. 
l2More specifically, in addition to the control variables in Table 3, the following control variables 
were tested: percent prime age male, net migration rate, value added per employee in 
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manufacturing, percent of establishments with 20+ employees, average size of establishment, 
average hourly earnings of production workers in manufacturing, percent change in average 
earnings between 1969 and 1970, median income of families, unemployment rate, index of 
industrialization, index of affluence, dummy variable for state located in the south, dummy 
variable for states with right-to-work laws, and fraction of employees in mining, construction, 
manufacturing, trade, finance, and services. Our final vector of control variables was primarily 
selected on the basis of individual t-statistics. 
13Since only two states use the NYRI rule, a similar interaction is not feasible for this rule. The 
residuals for New York and Rhode Island would be forced to zero, implying an implausible 
model that perfectly explains strike frequency in New York and Rhode Island. 
14Note that the coefficient on the interaction variables tends to decline over time. This is in part 
because the models were run with the maximum benefit measured in nominal dollars. When the 
maximums were deflated by a price index, these differences nearly disappeared. Signs and t-
statistics would not be affected by deflation. 
15As a further check, we estimated a fixed-effects model with the maximum UI benefit as an 
exogenous variable in the six states that used neither the “innocent bystander” nor “work 
stoppage” rule throughout the 1960-1974 period. Consistent with expectations, the coefficient on 
the maximum benefit was small and statistically insignificant. 
16We tested whether the column 1 coefficients differ from those in the other 24 jurisdictions over 
the same period. Based on an F-statistic of 1.8562, with 8 and 543 degrees of freedom, we 
cannot reject the null hypothesis of no difference at a .05 level. 
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